Istanbul Re-Run: The Contest for the Voters’ Conscience
May 12, 2019
In Istanbul, March 31 2019 local elections marked a turning point as the mayoral victory went to a politician from a different party background than the current government for the first time since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 1994 win (25.19%). Since then Ali Müfit Gürtüna and Kadir Topbaş (3 terms) had won the elections in which the 2014 victory for Topbaş was with 47.9% of the votes cast.
In the March 2019 local elections, Ekrem İmamoğlu won by 48.71% and got 4.16 million votes, narrowly winning over Binali Yıldırım’s 4.15 million votes. İmamoğlu was the candidate of CHP-İYİP bloc and supported by HDP, Yıldırım was the candidate of AKP-MHP bloc and supported by BBP. Since then, the High Election Council has decided on a re-run of the mayoral part of the elections (but not of the local municipalities and city council) on June 23.
This article will evaluate the victory probability of the contenders primarily based on a chart prepared by Ankara based think-tank TEPAV. This chart was posted to Twitter by Ayşegül Düşündere https://twitter.com/aysegultasoz/status/1126794958848057345?s=12 on May 10.
Here are the numericals I derived from this chart — to be followed by analytics and some concluding remarks.
Numericals
N1. This is the total number of voters in each category:
None indicates those who have not voted in the 2018 general elections. New indicates those voters that have the legal right (by age mostly) to vote for the first time.
N2. This is the number of voters that have not voted in each category:
N3. This is the percentage of votes a candidate gets from each category’s voting population:
Analytics
A1. There is a significant number of voters who have not voted in both 2018 general elections as well as 2019 local elections. 1 million 300 thousand voters have not voted in either election. 118,000 of voters who did not vote in 2018 came out to vote with a 59% lead for İmamoğlu. Further inclusion from this group might indicate similar voting behavior.
A2. Within the blocs, AKP-MHP bloc has around 2% more none-voters than CHP-IYIP bloc does. This presents a potential to bring out additional voters for Yıldırım.
A3. SP and HDP have significant amount of non-voters.
A4. Albeit small in overall numbers, a meaningful majority of new voters have voted for Yıldırım. Given the timing, potential new voters will be around 10,000 that will be pretty split close to equal.
A5. A significant portion of MHP voters chose the opposition candidate İmamoğlu. It is highly probable that MHP will target to sway some of these voters before the election.
A6. HDP voters have been supportive of İmamoğlu, surpassing even CHP and IYIP voters in proportional terms when it comes to those who have voted.
A7. Virtually no slippage in AKP and CHP voters show voting along party lines. Any break here could have major impact.
Conclusions
C1. Given the small difference, each vote is important will be the credo for this election. That being said, while there could be shifts big enough in between groups that could derail this statement; the statement itself is tautology because it applies in any contested race. Therefore, a more disciplined approach is to take in to consideration each voter category relative to their importance. That importance can be derived by the size of the voter base multiplied by the probability of their decision to vote multiplied by the potential for them to change votes.
Since the potential for the voters to change votes is a subjective evaluation, the already swung voters from the blocs would be the primary targets.
C1a. As per C1, MHP will target the 186,000 voters who have voted for İmamoğlu to switch them back. Close follow-up will switch a portion of these voters but given the metropolitan MHP voter base, this amount might fall around 1/3 of these voters.
C1b. As per N3, the voting portion of HDP is has been highly concentrated in favor of İmamoğlu and despite overtures by the AKP-MHP bloc, most or all of this group could be expected to repeat the same behavior.
C2. Would it be possible and meaningful to focus on the non-voters?
C2a. It would be highly speculative to assume which non-voters could be convinced to vote in this election. But there are certain groups in this category that warrant special attention. First of all, SP voters have mostly not voted in this March elections. Of the voting ones, their votes were spread slightly in favor of Yıldırım. Given the tone of the moment, slightly higher turnout and slightly more İmamoğlu leaning could be expected.
C2b. Of the other parties, a cohort of HDP voters have decided to stay out of the March elections, if half of them comes out to vote, their impact could be even greater than SP voters. While the ratio of İmamoğlu votes might be lower in these voters, it is probable that their increased turnout will be beneficial to İmamoğlu.
At this stage changes so far do not clearly indicate the outcome of the election in an analytical manner. However, there is one more factor to consider.
C3. Would the majority of voters who have voted along party lines in previous elections change course in this election?
Absent C3 option, the outcome of the election could go either way. However even a small deviation within any bloc total in favor of the other bloc or new voters deciding to come out would seal the outcome of this election. It would be fair to assume such changes either could happen because of exogenous factors or based on individual convictions that probably were shaped by the events following the March 31 elections.
C4. There are potential inconsistencies each bloc has to address when trying to broaden their appeal to the voters.
To this C4 point, overtures by AKP-MHP to HDP could win some limited voters but may endanger additional MHP voters to switch or not to vote. Similarly, CHP-İYİP may struggle to get the support of additional SP voters even with implicit SP party support to İmamoğlu. Once again, all the side factors tend to negate each other and the kingmaker factor seems to be intra-bloc perception of the election, candidate and the re-rerun decision.
Given the information and analysis so far; it would not be imprudent to surmise that if the public in general feels the re-run has been a good decision, Yıldırım most likely will win. If the public in general feels the re-run has been an unfair decision, İmamoğlu most likely will win. This will be a contest over the conscience of the voters (absent exogenous factors). While the majority would repeat their previous vote, this conscience factor will provide the deciding votes. In a free and fair election, impact of this conscience factor will be much more important that the tactical targeted campaign strategies to be employed (assuming each side runs their campaign in the best possible way).
First reliable survey results will come towards early June and the potential outcome will make its first appearance in these results. From that point on, the probability that these results will change except for an exogenous factor is low.
Final Words
I have assumed the conditions today are prevalent during the election period and no exogenous factors will have a significant effect on the voters. This assumption, while necessary for the narrow scope of this article, is one which is highly unlikely to foresee and has the greatest theoretical potential to effect the final outcome. Absent such a factor, perception of the re-run decision by voters will be the determining factor of this election. Nonetheless, this will be a tight contest. Regardless of the outcome, it is poised to have significant effect on Turkish politics to come on top of its effect so far.